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A TWO-TRACK THEORY OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS *
Abstract: Establishment Clause doctrine has long been informed by two
mutually antagonistic values: the separation of church and state, and
government neutrality with respect to religion. This puzzle of con-
flicting values mirrors that of Speech Clause doctrine, which has
operated for decades with a value conflict between content-based and
content-neutral regulation under the so-called "two-track" theory of the
Speech Clause. This Article compares Establishment Clause doctrine
with the two-track Speech Clause in order to illuminate how separation
and neutrality might coexist. Just as Speech Clause doctrine provides an
absolute minimum of constitutional protection for expression against
even content-neutral regulation, so also Establishment Clause doctrine
provides for an absolute minimum of church-state separation against
even religiously neutral government action. As a result, neutrality has
not totally eclipsed separation, which is the more fundamental
Establishment Clause value.
INTRODUCTION: Two CONFLICTING VALUES
The Establishment Clause has long been thought to protect two
values, the separation of religion and government from each other,
and government neutrality with respect to religion.' Separation re-
quires that religion and government each refrain from involving itself
in the affairs of the other. In Everson v. Board of Education, for example,
the Supreme Court of the United States declared that government
cannot "set up a church," or "adopt, . . . teach or practice religion." 2 It
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I See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (reading the Establishment
Clause as both forbidding laws that "prefer one religion over another" and requiring a
"wall of separation" between religion and government).
2 Id.
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also stated that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and
vice versa." Separation seeks to ensure that government and religion
each operate freely in their own separate spheres, uninhibited by
regulation or control by the other. 4
Neutrality requires that government regulate its interactions with
religious individuals and institutions so that it neither encourages nor
discourages religious beliefs or practices. In Epperson v. Arkansas, for
example, the Court stated that
[g] overnment in our democracy, state and national, must be
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion
or religious theory against another or even against the mili-
tant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmen-
tal neutrality between religion and religion, and between re-
ligion and nonreligion.5
Neutrality seeks to ensure that the degree of acceptance enjoyed by
any particular religion is the result of the free and independent
choices of its members, undistorted by government coercion or
influence.6
3 Id. at 16.
4 LAURF-NCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed. 1988);
Carl H. Esbeck, Myths, Miscues, and Misconceptions: No-Aid Separationism and the Establishment
Clause, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 285, 292 (1999) ("[T]he most funda-
mental aim of church/state separation ... is to keep these two centers of authority—God
and Caesar, so to speak—within their respective spheres of competence.").
5 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (Neither the federal gov-
ernment nor any state '`can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence anyone to go or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess belief or disbelief in any religion.").
6 See, e.g., Zorach v. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("We sponsor an attitude on
the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.... The gov-
ernment must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."); see also TRIBE,
supra note 4, at 1160-61 (*The establishment clause ... can be understood as designed in
part to assure that the advance of a church would come only from the voluntary support of
its followers and not from the political support of the state. Religious groups, it was be-
lieved, should prosper or perish 011 the intrinsic merit of their beliefs and practices.");
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 7bwards Religion, 39
DEPAut. L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990) (arguing that "substantive neutrality" requires govern-
ment "to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief
or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance").
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Neutrality and separation are in considerable tension.? Separa-
tion requires that the government sometimes treat religion worse, and
sometimes better, than comparable secular activities. An Establish-
ment Clause doctrine informed by separation presupposes that the
involvement of government in matters of religious belief and practice
threatens liberty in ways that government involvement in secular mat-
ters does not.8 Separationist doctrine thus subjects relationships be-
tween religion and government to special scrutiny, which may result
in religion's being subjected to legal and regulatory burdens not im-
posed on secular activities, or relieved from burdens that are gener-
ally imposed on such activities. 9 The School Prayer Cases, for example,
teach that government may not involve itself in the composition or
encouragement of religious worship in public schools, even if stu-
7 See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of
Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1139 (2002). The prin-
ciple dissenter to this view is Professor Laycock, who argues that separation and neutrality
are complementary strategies for implementing a policy of "substantive neutrality" that
minimizes governmental coercion and influence with respect to individual religious
choices. See Laycock, supra note 6, at 1001; Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separa-
tion and Neutrality, 46 EMORY U. 43 (1997). A similar view is espoused by Professor Esbeck,
although he does not articulate any role for separation in implementing substantive neu-
trality. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based
Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (1997) (arguing that religious liberty is maxi-
mized by minimizing "the government's influence over personal choices concerning relig-
ious beliefs and practices," and that this goal is "realized when government is neutral as to
the religious choices of its citizens"); Esbeck, supra note 4, at 316-17 (arguing that the
"common baseline" for measuring "the government's influence over personal choices
concerning religious beliefs and practices" is that which "minimize[s] the impact of gov-
ernmental action on individual religious choices").
As I and others have argued, the position that religious belief and practice are unique
and especially valuable activities thereby entitled to unique and special protection from
burdensome government action is no longer tenable. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Relig-
ious Conduct, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Founda-
tion: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. Urn!, ROCK L. Rev. 555
(1998). For there to be a genuine absence of government influence on individual religious
choices, goverinne ►t cannot advantage religion relative to comparable secular beliefs and
practices. Because most secular beliefs and practices—even most secular beliefs and prac-
tices that are morally comparable to religious belief and practice—have no special claim to
insulation from government influence or coercion, allowing such insulation only to relig-
ious beliefs and practices is a clear departure from neutrality. Laycock eliminates the ten-
sion between separation and neutrality only by begging the question whether religious
belief and activity merit special constitutional protection.
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Tb Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Relit
ion Clauses, '7 J. Commr. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996).
9 See, e.g., Laura S. Underkufiler, Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficufties and Dan-
gers in a Pluralistic Society, 27 OXFORD Rev. Enuc. 577, 583 (2001).
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dents who do not wish to participate are excused from doing so, and
even though the government's composition and encouragement of
comparable secular ceremonies, such as recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, is constitutionally unproblematic."
On the other hand, the Church Autonomy Cases hold that courts
may not resolve disputes among the members of religious organiza-
tions when doing so requires interpretation of the organizations'
dogma or theology, even though courts are free to resolve internal
disputes in secular organizations by examining the secular philoso-
phies or principles that inform the self-governance of such organiza-
tions." Because this rule of abstention frequently renders judicial re-
view of the governance decisions of religious associations unavailable,
such associations possess significantly greater freedom to deviate from
both legal norms and their own internal rules and practices than do
secular associations."
By contrast, government satisfies neutrality when it treats relig-
ious beliefs and practices no better, but also no worse, than compara-
ble secular activities." Under an Establishment Clause doctrine in-
formed by neutrality, religious belief and activity are not thought to
be unique, and religion is treated as simply one among many possible
activities in which citizens might choose to involve themselves. In
Widmar v. Vincent, for example, the Court held that a state university
which had generally opened up its campus facilities for student activi-
ties could not withhold access from students who wished to use the
facilities for prayer and Bible study; to have held otherwise, the Court
IS See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 3$ (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Whether the Pledge constitutes a secular
ceremony has recently been placed in doubt. See Newdow v. United States Congress, 292
F.3d 597, 606-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (two-to-one decision).
n Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Metn'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
12 This special favorable treatment of religious organizations has been undercut by the
interaction of the "neutral principles" exception of Jones u Wog', 443 U.S. 595 (1979), with
the formal neutrality of Employment Division u Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Frederick
Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L REV. 925, 943 &
nn.97-99 (2000).
15 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 Vim... L. REV. 37, 66 (2002).
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reasoned, would have violated neutrality by favoring secular student
activities over religious student activities. 14
The vitality of both separation and neutrality in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has created a difficult doctrinal situation. Al-
though it is not unusual for the doctrine of a particular Clause of the
Constitution to be informed by multiple values, 15
 confusion is inevita-
ble when doctrine is informed by mutually antagonistic ones. For ex-
ample, incongruities of Equal Protection Clause doctrine result from
constructions that understand the Clause as a warrant for both "color-
blind" government (which ignores race in making government deci-
sions) and remediation of past racial discrimination through "affirm-
ative action" (which expressly takes race into account in making deci-
sions). 16
 The fact that the Establishment Clause is animated by both
separation and neutrality makes articulation of a coherent theory of
that Clause similarly challenging because, as with Equal Protection
Clause doctrine, the competing values often point towards opposing
resolutions of cases.
The puzzle of antagonistic values that neutrality and separation
pose for Establishment Clause doctrine is not unique. Speech Clause
doctrine has operated for decades with such a value conflict under
the so-called "two-track" theory of freedom of speech. The two
"tracks" of Speech Clause doctrine are content-based and content-
neutral analysis, which correspond to contrasting values of social or-
der and the free flow of ideas and information. In its original form,
the two-track theory held that certain kinds of expression were simply
not protected by the Speech Clause, and thus were subject to regula-
tion and even prohibition on the basis of their content. The Speech
Clause protected all other expression, which was accordingly subject
only to content-neutral regulation of time, place, or manner. The
category of "unprotected" speech has evolved into a category more
accurately described as "low-value" speech, but the two competing
14
 454 U.S. 263 (1983); see Good News Club v. Milford Cen. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001);
Capitol Square Review & Adv. Bd. v. Pipette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr,
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Schs
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
13 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 1 (1966) (asserting that the Speech Clause is animated by values of self-fulfillment,
truth-seeking, democratic participation, and social balance).
16 Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995), and Rich-
mond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989), with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968), and
Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1964).
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analyses of content-based and content-neutral regulation continue to
organize Speech Clause doctrine.
I propose to compare Establishment Clause doctrine and the two-
track Speech Clause in the hope of illuminating how neutrality and
separation might coexist under the Establishment Clause. I will argue
that, just as Speech Clause doctrine provides an absolute minimum of
protection for freedom of expression against even content-neutral
regulation, so also Establishment Clause doctrine provides a mini-
mum level of church-state separation against even religiously neutral
government actions. In other words, not only has the separation of
church and state not been eclipsed by religious neutrality, but separa-
tion is actually the more fundamental Establishment Clause value. As
such, separation remains a necessary check on interactions between
religion and government that pass muster under neutrality analysis.
I will begin with a description of how the two-track theory devel-
oped and functions under the Speech Clause, 17 and will follow that
with a discussion of how an analogous theory might function under
the Establishment Clause. 18 I will close with some observations on
what the two-track theory might mean for areas of Establishment
Clause doctrine involving education vouchers, faith-based delivery of
social services, and public school prayer. 18
I. THE TWO-TRACK THEORY OF THE SPEECH CLAUSE
A. Doctrinal Development: Content-Based and Content-Neutral Analyses
The two-track theory has its origin in a dictum voiced by the ma-
jority in Cantwell v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court reviewed
the conviction of a Jehovah's Witness for common-law breach of the
peace for having played an offensive phonograph recording for
passersby on a public sidewalk. Although the Court reversed the con-
viction, it nevertheless observed that "epithets or personal abuse" do
not constitute "communication of information or opinion safe-
guarded by the Constitution," so that criminal punishment of such
expressions would raise no Speech Clause issues."
Two years later, the Court cited the Cantwell dictum in holding
that "insulting or 'fighting' words"—that is, words that "by their very
17 See infra notes 20-56 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 57-106 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 107-131 and accompanying text.
" Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
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utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace"—are not protected by the Speech Clause. 21 The Court justified
its holding with the twin observations that "the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances," and that there
are "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem."22
 The Court went on to suggest
that, along with fighting words, defamatory, profane, and obscene
speech are also unprotected by the Speech Clause. 23
 Shortly thereaf-
ter, the Court added commercial speech to the list of constitutionally
unprotected utterances," and subsequently confirmed that defama-
tory and obscene speech are indeed outside the bounds of Speech
Clause protection."
As originally conceived and applied, the two-track theory relieved
the government of the need to prove that unprotected speech posed
a "clear and present danger" to legitimate governmental or social in-
terests." Once the government demonstrated that expression fell into
an unprotected category, it could justify punishment of such expres-
sion merely by showing that it bore a conceivable relationship to a le-
gitimate objective—a showing that is easily made. 27 As time went on,
however, the Court narrowed the definitional boundaries of unpro-
tected speech," at the same time that it began to give some constitu-
21
 ChapliDS1Cy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942) (quoting Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 309-10)).
22 Id at 571-72.
23
 Id, at 573.
"Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
22
 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (group libel).
26 See, e.g., Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266; see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 70 (1966) (arguing that the two-track theory
was developed precisely to avoid application of the clear-and-present-danger test to speech
that was traditionally punishable at common law).
27
 See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding ra-
tionality of traffic safety regulation prohibiting advertising on delivery trucks unless related
to the business using the trucks, because local authorities may well have concluded that
those who advertise their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic prob-
lem in view of the nature or extent of the advertising which they use").
23 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining a work as obscene only if:
(1) "the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the
work taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest"; (2) the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law"; and
(3) "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value");
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding public profanity not punishable absent
strong and detailed proof that it would provoke a violent audience reaction or seriously
1078	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1071
tional protection to categories of speech that had previously been
thought to lie entirely outside the ambit of the Speech Clause." This
trend has persisted to the point that regulation of speech based upon
its "unprotected" character has virtually disappeared." Although the
two-track theory remains, contemporary doctrine associates content-
based regulation with "low-value" rather than "unprotected" speech. 31
undermine public morality); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding advocacy
of criminal behavior punishable only when the speaker expressly advocates commission of
a criminal act under circumstances which make the act highly likely to occur in the imme-
diate future).
" E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (commercial speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation
of government official).
SeeDANIEL A. FARBER, Tim FIRST AMENDMENT 14 (1998) (Categories of unprotected
speech "continue to receive special treatment," but it is a '`gross oversimplification ... to
say that any of these categories is currently unprotected by the First Amendment. For each
category, the Court has now created a set of rules detailing the boundaries of permissible
government regulation.") ; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 103 (1999)
(observing that the Court has not upheld conviction of a speaker for advocating subversive
or criminal activity or provoking a hostile audience response since 1951); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sue.
Or. REV. 191, 217-18 (arguing that New York Times eliminated the doctrinal concept of
"unprotected" speech).
31 See FARBER, supra note 30, at 14-15; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Brennan and the
Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Odyssey, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1333, 1344 (1991).
[My abandoning the strict "two-level" theory of "protected" and "unpro-
tected" expression, Brennan's opinion in New York Times ushered in a new era
of first amendment doctrine in which the Court, freed from the rigid con-
straints of the past, has been able to adopt a more flexible mode of analysis to
deal with a broad range of "low value" expression.
.Id. The insertion of low-value speech into Speech Clause doctrine, however, has blurred
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral analysis. See, e.g., City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-51 (1986) (arguing that zoning regulation of the
secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses does not constitution content-based regu-
lation). Compare City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728, 1741 (2002)
(Kennedy, j., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the purported content-neutrality
of Renton-style zoning ordinances is a fiction, and concluding that a zoning ordinance that
applies only to sexually oriented businesses is necessarily content-based), with id. at 1745-
46 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, B., dissenting) (arguing that regulation of the
secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses "occupies a kind of limbo between full-
blown, content-based restrictions and regulations that apply without any reference to the
substance of what is said," and that such regulation should be called "content correlated"
to remind judges of the increasing constitutional risk of censorship "when a law applies
selectively only to speech of particular content").
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As before, speech is presumed to be high-value unless it is shown to fit
within one of the low-value categories. 32
The two tracks of Speech Clause doctrine, then, are content-
based and content-neutral analysis. Content-based regulation of ex-
pression is suspect when applied to so-called "high-value" speech like
criticism of the government, but is generally permitted (although sub-
ject to limitations) in case of low-value speech like private libel, com-
mercial speech, profanity, and pornography. High-value speech, on
the other hand, may be regulated only by content-neutral laws that
restrict only the time, place, or manner of such speech.
B. The "Central Meaning" of the Speech Clause:
Preservation of Self-Government
The two-track theory stems from the widespread intuition that
not all expression is of the same value. It is based on a "tolerance"
model of the Speech Clause, which presupposes the ability reliably to
distinguish valuable speech from deviant expression, presumptively
permitting only speech that "serves a positive social function." 33 If one
grants the premise that some speech has more social value than other
speech, something like the two-track theory is inevitable. Without it,
the heavy burden of justification generally imposed on government
regulation of speech would have to be diluted in order to permit the
regulation of speech of dubious value, like child pornography; other-
wise, the same heavy burden of justification generally imposed on
government regulation of high-value speech would have to be im-
32 See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15 (concluding that profane expression of a political view
was entitled to full Speech Clause protection because it did not constitute obscenity,
fighting words, or speech that provoked a hostile audience reaction).
33 Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and
Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1565 (1988). Gey is, of course, relying on the classic definition
of governmental "tolerance" under which the government presupposes the existence of a
"correct" view of a matter, but nevertheless permits a certain degree of dissent. See, e.g., 18
Tint OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 199, 200 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "tolerate" as "to put
up with" and "toleration" as "the disposition to be patient with or indulgent to the opin-
ions or practices of others"). An exemplar of such "toleration" was the seventeenth century
English Act of Toleration, which reaffirmed the Anglican establishment as the official state
church of England, but permitted non-Anglican Protestants a right to practice their relig-
ion subject to considerable civil disabilities. See Tricorns J. CURRY, FAREWELL TO CHRIS-
TENDOM; THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 24-25 (2001). This classic
definition is not to be confused with the more widely used contemporary understanding of
"tolerance" as openness to, or acceptance of, opposing views.
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posed on regulation of low-value speech.34 Across-the-board dilution
of the burden of justification would seriously undermine constitu-
tional protection of high-value speech, whereas across-the-board ap-
plication of a heavy burden of justification would place speech that
probably should be regulated beyond government contro1. 35 The two-
track theory permits substantial regulation of low-value speech with-
out directly threatening protection of high-value speech.
The two-track theory of the Speech Clause thus depends on a
routing mechanism that determines whether the Court will apply con-
.tent-based or content-neutral analysis by distinguishing high-value
from low-value speech. This routing function is performed by the re-
lation of the speech to self-government. A multitude of commentators
throughout the twentieth century have argued that the predominant
purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses is to secure popular control
over political decision making and the operation of government gen-
erally by prohibiting punishment of speech that criticizes government
or otherwise discusses matters of public import. 36 The Court declared
15 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL. CoNsTrruTioN 233-34 (1993); Arnold H. Loewy,
The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Lou Value Speech, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195, 202-05 (2001);
cf. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 131-32 (3d rev. ed. 2000) (ar-
guing that the Court's reflexive application of stringent review to state actions that only
modestly infringed upon the freedom of speech during the 1930s left it with no doctrinal
flexibility in its review of antisubversion statutes during the "Red scare" of the 1950s).
SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 234.
" See, e.g., ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (1967) (It
is obvious that under [early American common] ... law liberty of the press was nothing
more than absence of the censorship, as Blackstone said. All through the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, there existed beside this definite legal meaning of liberty of the press, a
definite popular meaning: the right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs. There can
be no doubt that this was in a general way what freedom of speech meant to the framers of
the Constitution."); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVI-
LEGE" 18-19 (2000) (The "popular tradition" of freedom of speech from the time of the
founding into the twentieth century "especially emphasized free speech in relation to de-
mocracy, as well as free speech as an inherent human right."); JohN HART ELY, DENtoc.-
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 93-94, 112 (1980) (The Speech,
Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses serve the "central function of assuring an open po-
litical dialogue and process" and 'were centrally intended to help make our government
processes work, to ensure the open and informed discussion of political issues, and to
check our government when it gets out of bounds."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, Fritz
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); JOHN RAWLS, Pouncm. LIBER-
ALISM 342-0 (1996) (observing that the crime of seditious libel would prevent "the public
press and free discussion [from] play[ing] their role in informing the electorate" and
would "undermine the wider possibilities of self-government"); SuNsTEN, supra note 34, at
237 (There can be little doubt that suppression by the government of political ideas that
it disapproved of or found threatening was the central motivation for the [Speech
C}lause."); Kalven, supra note 30, at 208 ('The [First] Amendment has a 'central mean-
ing—a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, with which,
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this principle to be the "central meaning" of the First Amendment in
New York Times v. Sullivan," and has repeatedly affirmed it in subse-
quent decisions.s8
To identify the protection of speech relating to political and pub-
lic matters as the central purpose of the Speech Clause is not to deny
the importance of other kinds of expression protected by the Speech
Clause, particularly expression relating to self-fulfillment or the
search for truth." As Justice Brandeis famously argued, the framers of
the First Amendment believed that the ultimate purpose of govern-
ment was to protect the freedom of citizens to live their lives as they
saw fit, thus making the freedom of speech not only a means of creat-
in Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people
and not 'in the people over the Government.'") (quoting N.Y.
  Times, 376 U.S. at 275).
37
 376 U.S. at 273-75 (declaring that the controversy surrounding the Sedition Act of
1'798 "crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment,"
which is that the "right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials" is a
"fundamental principle of the American form of government").
" E.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 n.20 (2001) ("The essential thrust of the
First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of
ideas.'") (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) ("The First Amendment denies govern-
ment the power to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful,
excessive, or unwise. In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the govern-
ment, but the people individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations
and political committees who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on
public issues . .."); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agree-
ment that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concern-
ing public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.") ; see
also Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (The contemporary purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses is
"to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.") ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940).
The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution em-
braces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.
The exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from
oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liber-
ties as adequate to supply the public need for information and education with
respect to the significant issues of the times.... Freedom of discussion, if it
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society
to cope with the exigencies of their period.
Id.
59
 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) ("[O]ur cases have
never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or
ethical matters ... is not entitled to full First Amendment protection.").
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ing a government that would protect self-realization, but an end of
self-realization itself.° But Brandeis also emphasized the close link
between self-government and self-fulfillment." Although the category
of high-value speech is hardly exhausted by political speech, no other
kind of high-value expression is so consistently placed at the "core" of
expression protected by the Speech Clause. 42
4° Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those
who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free
to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail
over the arbitrary. They valued liberty as both an end and a means."); accord Cohen, 403
U.S. at 24.
The constitutional right of flee expression is powerful medicine in a society
as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove gov-
ernmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the
hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citi-
zenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.
Id,
41 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and cow-age to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth .... Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argu-
ment of force in its worst form.
Id.; see also Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civil Courage: The Brandeis
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 672 (1988) (arguing that
Brandeis understood self-development to affirm the concept of self-government, the
point that the state exists for the benefit of its citizens and not vice versa"); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 245, 263 (arguing that
self-development underwrites self-government because the latter is possible only if voters
acquire "intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare").
42 See, e.g., Republican Party v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2530 (2002) ("LS) peech about
the qualifications of candidates for public office" is "at the core of First Amendment free-
doms."); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conim'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) ("[H]anding out
leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint...is the essence of First
Amendment expression.") ; Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988) ("Core political
speech" consists of "both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of
the merits of the proposed change."); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 203 (1996)
(arguing for constitutive over instrumental justifications for the freedom of speech on the
ground that the former do not protect "the First Amendment's political core");
McCLosttzv, supra note 34, at 155 (observing that modern Supreme Court decisions per-
wit the regulation of "core 'political speech' only in extreme circumstances"); RAWLS,
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The two-track theory thus rests on the proposition that the pre-
eminent purpose of the Speech Clause, though obviously not the only
one, is to ensure popular control of government by protecting the
free flow of information necessary for citizens to assess whether the
government is doing what they wish, and to criticize it vigorously and
publicly when it is not.° As measured by this purpose, some speech is
simply not as important as other speech.44
 Which doctrinal track one
uses in a Speech Clause case—content-based or content-neutral analy-
sis—depends on the proximity of the speech to this central purpose.
Professor Sunstein, for example, lists three of the four characteristics
that seem to characterize low-value speech as (1) a tenuous relation to
"governmental process" and "popular control of public affairs," (2) a
noncognitive message that does not expressly "transmit ideology or
ideas," and (3) a likelihood that regulation or prohibition of the
speech is not motivated by government self-interest.° The further
that speech strays from the Speech Clause's core purpose of assisting
popular control of government by ensuring the free flow of informa-
tion about political and public affairs, the more likely it is that such
speech will be accorded low-value status.
supra note 36, at 348 (arguing that the "central range" of the freedom of speech consists of
the "free public use of our reason in all matters that concern the justice of the basic struc-
ture [of government] and its social policies").
43
 Stms'rEtN, supra note 34, at 238 ("Restrictions on political speech have the distinc-
tive feature of impairing the ordinary channels for political change."); Cass R. Sunstein,
Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 622-23 ("The guarantee of free
speech is designed largely to combat the evils of factional tyranny and self-interested repre-
sentation, and to ensure that government outcomes are the product of some form of de-
liberation on the part of the citizenry. If portions of the citizenry are powerless and for
that reason unable to participate in deliberative processes, free speech will not serve its
goals.").
" See, e.g., SuNsmIN, supra note 34, at 233 ( -The absence of [Speech Clause] protec-
tion for conspiracies, purely verbal workplace harassment of individuals on the basis of
race and sex, unlicensed medical and legal advice, bribery, and threats appears to owe
something to a distinction between political and nonpolitical use of speech."); David M.
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm. L. REV. 1205, 1352
(1983) ("[T] here are compelling reasons rooted in first amendment theory for affording
more constitutional protection to 'public ideological solicitation' than to 'private
nonideological solicitation.' Advocating robbery or murder for private gain surely stands
on a different constitutional footing than advocating principled resistance to politically
unpopular government policies.").
43
 Sunstein, supra note 43, at 603-04. Sunstein identifies the fourth characteristic as a
low probability that regulation has been undertaken for "constitutionally impermissible
reasons" or to produce "constitutionally troublesome harms." Id. at 604. Sunstein has else-
where emphasized, however, that "[t] he Court has yet to offer a clear principle to unify the
categories of speech that it treats as 'low value.'" SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 233.
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To summarize, a speech regulation is routed between the con-
tent-based and the content-neutral analytic tracks on the basis of the
proximity of the speech it regulates to democratic self-government.
The more political the speech, the more closely it relates to matters of
public policy and interest, and the more it communicates a cognitive
ideological message, the more likely that the speech will be consid-
ered high-value and the less likely that content-based regulation of it
will be upheld.
C. The Absolute Value of the Freedom of Speech
Content-based regulation of high-value speech is suspect under
the Speech Clause, and is upheld only if narrowly tailored to a com-
pelling state interest.` Content-neutral regulation of such speech, by
contrast, is generally upheld. Even so, content neutrality is not a
sufficient condition for upholding a regulation of speech under the
Speech Clause. Content-neutral regulations must also be "narrowly
tailored" to a "significant" or "substantial" regulatory interest and
must leave open "adequate alternative avenues of communication." 47
The narrow-tailoring and substantial-interest requirements have
proved to be less significant protections of freedom of expression
than one might assume from their rhetorical similarity to the classic
formulation of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Nar-
row tailoring does not demand that government use the least restric-
tive or intrusive means of regulating , speech, but requires only a show-
ing that the government's regulatory interest "would be achieved less
effectively" in the absence of regulation, and that the regulation does
not burden "substantially more speech" than is necessary to protect
the government's interest.° Because it does not require any balancing
at the margin, narrow tailoring results in invalidation of content-
neutral speech regulations only when the fit between the govern-
ment's interest in regulation and the speech actually regulated is ex-
46 See, e.g., Republican Party, 1225 S. Ct. at 2530; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
47 E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 647-51 (1981).
48 Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-800; see, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 297 (1984) (holding that because the government had a legitimate interest in
protecting the environment of national parks, and that environment might be harmed by
allowing protestors to sleep at national park sites not open for camping, "the ban is safe
from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the manner in
which a demonstration may be carried out").
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ceptionally loose." Similarly, relatively lightweight regulatory inter-
ests, such as preservation of aesthetic appearance, have been held to
satisfy the substantiality standard." _
In contrast to narrow tailoring and substantiality, the adequate
communicative alternatives prong of the content-neutrality test has a
more consistent bite. The Court will often strike down a content-
neutral law if it prevents a speaker's communication of the message.'"
For example, the Court applies heightened scrutiny to content-
neutral regulations that eliminate or substantially restrict an entire
mode of communication." Even when a law leaves numerous alterna-
tive means of communicating the speaker's message, it may neverthe-
less be struck down if it leaves a particular speaker with no alternative
49 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089-
90 (2002) (striking down door-to-door solicitation permit designed to prevent fraud and
crime and to protect residential privacy, because permit interfered with "a significant
number of noncommercial 'canvassers' promoting a wide variety of 'causes,'" including
religious and political ones, and virtually eliminated anonymous and spontaneous solicita-
don). The Court has sometimes understood a less restrictive means requirement to de-
mand only that there exist no regulatory alternative that would be equally as effective as
the one chosen by the government. See, e.g., Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitu-
tional Law, 65 Mimi. L. REV. 1, 38 (1980) (citing Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951)). Under heightened scrutiny, however, a least restrictive means requirement is
usually understood to impose upon the government the much heavier burden of showing
that all regulatory alternatives would substantially undermine the government's interest,
rather than undermining it to some slight degree. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv.
1482, 1486-87 (1975). Under this analysis, an alternative regulation that is substantially
less restrictive of speech while only modestly undermining the government's interest is a
less restrictive alternative" even though it is not as efficient as the means chosen by the
government. See Bice, supra, at 38-39.
5° See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806-07
(1984). Additionally, seven Justices in Metromedia, Inc. u City of San Diego agreed that aes-
thetics constituted a regulatory interest sufficiently substantial to justify a complete prohi-
bition of billboards. 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (four-Justice plurality opinion); id. at 552
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 560 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
51
 See Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. ItEv. 46, 67 (1987) (ob-
serving that the Court ordinarily subjects to heightened scrutiny "laws that substantially or
wholly prohibit particular means of expression").
52
 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (anonymous and spontaneous door-
to-door solicitation); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (residential lawn and win-
dow signs); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (political boycotts);
Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 516 (billboards); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61 (1981) (nude dancing); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)
(charitable solicitation); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (spending money); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (door-to-door
solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (leaflets).
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means that are "readily interchangeable" with the prohibited means.°
In evaluating alternate means, the Court has been particularly protec-
tive of relatively inexpensive modes of communication that have tradi-
tionally been used by persons of limited finances. 54 These tendencies
are even more pronounced among lower courts. 55
53 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating as applied to NAACP
the rule prohibiting retention of attorney in matter in which one is not a party and has no
right or liability, because the rule would have blocked most NAACP lawsuits, and NAACP
had no effective alternative to litigation as a means of pursuing its civil rights goals); see also
Stone, supra note 51, at 61 (Although the regulation in Button, unlike the one in Buckley,
left open numerous alternative means by which the NAACP might have pursued its objec-
tives, "these alternatives are not interchangeable with litigation. Litigation is a distinct
means of political expression.").
as E.g., Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. at 2087 ( "[B]ecause they lack significant financial re-
sources, the ability of the [Jehovah's) Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by
regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door. In addition, the [Court's]
cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pain-
phleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. "); Ladue, 512 U.S. at 57 (The ban on
residential yard and window signs left inadequate communicative alternatives because
residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Espe-
cially for persons of modest means or limited mobility ...."); Martin, 319 U.S. at 146 (in-
validating ban on door-to-door distribution of leaflets because such distribution is essen-
tial to the poorly financed causes of little people"); see also Members of City Council , 466 U.S.
at 812 n.30 (The Court has shown ''special solicitude for forms of expression that are
much less expensive than feasible alternatives and hence may be important to a large seg-
ment of the citizenry."). But see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 549-50 (upholding ban on
graffiti even though graffiti is an "inexpensive means of communicating political, com-
mercial, and frivolous messages to large numbers of people" and "some creators of graffiti
have no effective alternative means of publicly expressing themselves").
55 See Alan E. Brownstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 101, 115 n.45 (1999). For lower court decisions applying heightened
scrutiny to content-neutral regulations that eliminate or substantially restrict an entire
mode of communication, see, for example, Perry v. Los Angeles Police Department, 121 F.3d
1365,1371-72 (9th Cir. 1997); Bery u City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 699 (2d Cir. 1996); Cleve-
land Area Board of Realtors u City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1996); ISKCON of
Potomac, Inc. u Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Grossman u City of Portland, 33
F.3d 1200, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1994); Gerritsen u City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 580 (9th
Cir. 1993); Arlington County Republican Committee u Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587, 596 (4th
Cir. 1993); Hays County Guardian u Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 121 (5th Cir. 1992); Gaudiya
Vaishnava Society u City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 1990); Ameritech Corp.
u United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 737 (N.D. Ill. 1994); International Eateries of America, Inc. u
Broward County, 726 F. Supp. 1556, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1987). For lower court decisions that
strike down a content-neutral law because it leaves no alternative means that is readily
interchangeable with the prohibited means, see, for example, Bay, 97 F.3d at 699; Euclid,
88 F.3d at 390-91; Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207-08; Arlington County, 983 F.2d at 596. For
lower court decisions in which relatively inexpensive and traditional modes of communica-
tion are protected against content-neutral regulation, see, for example, Euclid, 88 F.3d at
390-91; ISKCON, 61 E3d at 959; Vittitow u City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1107 (6th
Cir. 1995); Gerritsen, 994 F.2d at 580; Gaudiya Vaishnava Society, 952 F.2d at 1066.
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Professor Kalven described heightened scrutiny of content-
neutral regulation of important or traditional means of communica-
tion as an appropriate placement of "the thumb of the Court . . . on
the speech side of the scales" in the constitutional balance of govern-
ment regulation against freedom of expression. 56
 Once speech is
classified as high-value, it should be accorded a presumption of im-
portance that need not attach to low-value speech. Accordingly, even
speech regulations that are content-neutral must leave open realistic
alternative avenues for expression.
In short, the predominance of democratic self-government over
other justifications for speech is reflected in the communicative alter-
natives prong of content-neutral analysis, which embodies special
concern to ensure the free flow of information even when regulation
of high-value speech is content-neutral and justified by a substantial
government interest.
II. A TWO-TRACK THEORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Doctrinal Development: Separation and Neutrality Analyses
Although in Everson u Board of Education the Supreme Court had
emphasized the importance of both neutrality and separation,57 it was
separation that dominated the first three decades of Establishment
Clause decisions 58
 Invoking neutrality rhetoric largely as a matter of
form during this era," the Court struck down most government ac-
tion that helped or encouraged religious belief and practice, such as
public school prayer and government aid to religiously sponsored
elementary and secondary schools.°
56
 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sue. CT.
REv, I, 28; see also Stone, supra note 51, at 79-80 ("In deciding whether and to what extent
particular content-neutral restrictions diminish the opportunities for free expression, the
Court should err on the side of free speech. It should allocate the risk of uncertainty to the
government, not to speakers.").
57
 See Everson v. 13d. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,15-16 (1947).
55 See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,233
(1994).
" See FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC Or CHURCH AND STATE 1-2 (1995)
(Although It] he Court has long purported to ground its establishment clause doctrine in
government neutrality," the decisions themselves seem to have no such pattern.).
*For decisions invalidating public school prayer, see School District u Sclzempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963); Engel u Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For decisions invalidating government aid
to religious elementary and secondary schools, see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek u Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon u Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also Walz v. Tax
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Although the Court continued to invalidate government aid to
religion on separationist grounds into the 1980s, 61 by then it had also
become clear that an Establishment Clause doctrine based primarily
on separation was unsatisfactory. The dramatic growth of the welfare
state during the twentieth century created positive rights that separa-
tion analysis generally denied to religion.62 In a world in which most
individuals and groups are entitled to receive government benefits
and funding, withholding such benefits and funding solely because
the recipient is religious constitutes a penalty on religious belief and
activity.° This clearly violates Everson's injunction that the government
remain neutral, not only as between religious denominations, but also
as between religion and nonreligion. 64
The inequity entailed in preventing religious individuals and
groups from receiving benefits and funds that are freely available to
secular individuals and groups made the development and applica-
tion of neutrality analysis inevitable. The Court began to incorporate
neutrality reasoning into its decisions during the 1980s and 1990s,
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding on separationist grounds exemption of
churches from property tax); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating for
lack of a secular purpose curriculum policy that forbade teaching of any theory of human
origin); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating on separa-
tionist grounds religious instruction in public schools). But see Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding on neutrality grounds participation by religious schools in
textbook loan program); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws on ground that they had a secular purpose and effect); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding released time program of off-campus religious instruction for
fear that contrary decision would constitute hostility to religion). See generally GEDICKS,
supra note 59, at 45-52, 64-74 (summarizing the doctrines set forth in the public school
prayer and religious school aid decisions).
61 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
398 (1985); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 Mtickt. L. REV, 279, 366 (2001) ("Through the 1980s and the early 1990s, the
Court continued along a twisting path of prohibiting all but incidental aid to religious
schools.").
62 See Esbeck, supra note 4, at 289-90; Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestab-
lishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part 11.—The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV.
513, 514-15 (1968); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 67.
63 GEDICRS, supra note 59, at 57; see alsoJoHN Wrrre, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 183 (2000) (arguing that the presence of the modern gov-
ernment in virtually all aspects of modern life renders the Madisonian understanding of
liberty as the absence of government unrealistic in practice); Giannella, supra note 62, at
522-24 (arguing that a wholly collectivized state committed to both religious liberty and
separation of church and state must give substantial aid to religious individuals and institu-
tions notwithstanding its commitment to separationism, so that such persons and entities
would have equal opportunities with secular individuals and institutions for self and com-
munity development).
64 See 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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repeatedly holding, for example, that the Establishment Clause does
not justify the use of a student's religious viewpoint as a basis for ex-
cluding the student from accessing public education facilities or funds
that the student would otherwise be eligible to use for expressive pur-
poses.° This reasoning was soon extended to government benefits
generally, with the concomitant narrowing or overruling of prior
separationist decisions that had prohibited receipt of such benefits by
religious individuals and institutions." Indeed, for a time it seemed
that neutrality analysis would wholly displace separation analysis un-
der the Establishment Clause.67
But complete displacement never occurred. The Court's most
recent school prayer decision confirmed that separation remains an
important element of Establishment Clause doctrine," and significant
0 See Good News Club v. Milford Ctr. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842-26 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 396-97 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 248-49 (1990); Widmar v. Vmcent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
The Court abandoned the religious exemption doctrine and installed neutrality as the
governing Free Exercise Clause value during this period. See Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). It has reaffirmed its core holding in Smith on two subsequent
occasions. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-16 (1997); Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). For an account of the shift in
Free Exercise doctrine during this period, see GEDICKS, supra note 59, at 99-109.
66
 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2472 (2002) (limiting Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 798); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. '793, 808 (2000) (overruling Wolman, 433 U.S. at 255;
Meek, 421 U.S. at 352 (plurality opinion)); id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (overruling
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402; overruling in part Ball, 473 U.S. at 373; and limiting Lemon, 403
U.S. at 602); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1993); Witters v.
Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-89 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 395-99 (1983); see also Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (invalidating
sales tax exemption for religious magazines); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703, 708-11 (1985) (invalidating state law requiring that religious employees be excused
from working on their Sabbath).
Lupu, sttpra note 58, at 246-47. For an account of the development of neutrality
doctrine under the Establishment Clause, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, Neutrality in Esta•
lishment Clause Interpretation: Its Past and Future [hereinafter Gedicks, Establishment Clause
Neutrality], in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN CRISIS! DEBATING NEUTRALITY 191 (Stephen
V. Monsma ed., 2002) [hereinafter CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS].
" See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-06 (2000) (citing Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)) (striking down practice of student invocations prior to
high school football games because, inter alia, the school had "failed to divorce itself from
the religious content in the invocations," with the result that the prayers bore "the imprint
of the State" and were correctly perceived as having been invited and encouraged by the
school).
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aspects of the doctrine remain informed largely by separation.° Neu
trality analysis now appears to control cases involving government dis-
tribution of financial and tangible benefits and services to religious
persons and organizations, whereas separation analysis continues to
determine cases involving religious worship and speech by govern-
ment, internal disputes among the members of religious organiza-
tions, and the delegation of government power to religious persons or
organizations."
The two tracks of Establishment Clause doctrine, then, are sepa-
ration and neutrality analysis. Separation analysis prohibits most gov-
ernment aid to, and interactions with, religion, even when these are
undertaken on the same basis as aid to comparably situated secular
individuals and organizations. Neutrality analysis, by contrast, permits
government aid to and interaction with religious individuals and or-
ganizations, so long as this is done on the same basis as aid to compa-
rably situated secular individuals and organizations.
B. The "Central Meaning" of the Establishment Clause: Prevention of the
Government-Established Church
In contrast to the model of government tolerance that under-
writes the two-track Speech Clause, the two-track Establishment
Clause presupposes a model of government skepticism with respect to
religion. Because moral or ethical certainty about religion is not pos-
sible—there is no way of demonstrating that any particular set of relig-
ious beliefs is the "true" or "right" one—the government must remain
agnostic and uncommitted in relation to all religions, a posture suita-
bly maintained by separation analysis.n The entitlement of religious
69 See, e.g., Underkuffler, supra note 9, at 579 (summarizing religious freedom under
the First Amendment as consisting of government recognition and enforcement of relig-
ious toleration and freedom of conscience, equal treatment of religious and nonreligious
persons, and institutional separation of church and state).
70 See Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v.
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 Wm. Sc MARY L. REV. 771, 802-07 (2001);
see also Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 201.
[Separation] is likely to remain the controlling establishment clause value in
two kinds of cases: those in which neutrality cannot give a plausible account
of the relationship between church and state . • and those in which the rela-
tionship between church and state too closely approaches the paradigm of
the state-established church, despite a plausible account of neutrality.
Id.
71 See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 108-09 (2002) ('The Es-
tablishment Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth. ... It means that the
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individuals and groups to their fair share of welfare state largesse,
however, requires the application of neutrality analysis to ensure that
religious individuals and groups are treated equally with respect to
their secular counterparts. The two-track Establishment Clause at-
tempts to guard simultaneously against government-established relig-
ion by use of separation analysis, and discrimination against religion
in the distribution of positive social welfare rights and benefits by use
of neutrality analysis. Establishment Clause doctrine thus requires
some means of routing church-state interactions to one analysis or the
other. This function is performed by the resemblance of a church-
state interaction to one of the classic attributes of the government-
established church in the eighteenth century: church-state interac-
tions that resemble one of these attributes trigger separation analysis;
other church-state interactions undergo neutrality analysis.
Father Curry has persuasively argued that the phrase "establish-
ment of religion" in the Establishment Clause was understood by
Americans of the founding era to refer to a church which the gov-
ernment funded and controlled and in which it used its coercive
power to encourage participation, like the Anglican church in Eng-
land, or the Roman Catholic church in southern Europe." A church
"established" in this manner was understood to have three signal
characteristics. First, as the guardian of the official government relig-
ion, the established church properly exercised the coercive power of
government, including the power to enforce as criminal infractions of
the church's denominational rules and moral requirements," as well
as the power to reserve governmental offices and other privileges ex-
clusively for its congregants. 74
 Second, the established church was en-
state may not declare articles of faith. The state may not express an opinion about religious
matters. It may not encourage citizens to hold certabt religious beliefs."); cf. Gey, supra
note 33, at 1566 (arguing that under a skepticism model of the Speech Clause, it is pre-,
sumed that no theory of moral certainty exists that would permit a determination that
deviant speech is sufficiently antisocial that it may properly be suppressed).
72 CURRY, supra note 33, at 16, 37, 109; TET—OMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 191-92 (1986).
75 WrrrE, supra note 63, at 190 (noting that lc] ontraventions of royal religious policy
were punishable both as heresy and as treason"); see, e.g., 4 Wn..marvr BLACKSTONE, BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE Laws or ENGLAND *52 (describing the system of mone-
tary fines imposed by the Crown on those who did not frequent Anglican services).
74 See WrrrE, supra note 63, at 190 ("The [English] common law ... proscribed various
forms of heresy, dissent, and nonconformity. Communicant status in the established
church was a condition for citizenship status in the commonwealth. Religious dissenters, if
tolerated, were foreclosed front most political and ecclesiastical offices and various social
and economic opportunities."); see, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 73, at *52-53
(observing that reserving offices of trust and profit for communicants of the Church of
England is an appropriate way for the magistrate to discharge his legal obligation to
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titled to a share of general tax revenues and other government
financial assistance in direct support of its worship, rituals, and other
denominational activities, often in the form of mandatory tithes col-
lected from members and nonmembers alike. 75 Third, significant as-
pects of the established church were subject to government control or
approval, such as the definition of doctrine and the selection of lead-
ers.76
Many of the repressive attributes of the Anglican establishment in
England were replicated in the colonies." Under the Anglican estab-
appropriate way for the magistrate to discharge his legal obligation to protect the Church
of England); id. at *58-59 (describing the Corporation and Test Acts, which prohibited, on
penalty of fine and disqualification, any municipal or corporate officer from holding office
unless he received communion in the Church of England and swore an oath disavowing
belief in transubstantiation); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL, RELIGION AND THE CONSTI-
TurioN 23 (2002) (observing that Anglican bishops sat in the House of Lords as a matter
of right, and noting that as a nontrinitarian, Isaac Newton, required special leave of Par-
liament to teach at Cambridge); Benjamin Franklin, Letter to the London Packet (June 3,
1772) (observing that in England dissenters are excluded from all offices of trust and
profit, and university education is restricted to the sons of Church of England communi-
cants), reprinted in 5 THE Fotitnnsts' CoNsrtrtrrtoN 58-59 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987).
75 E.g., Franklin, supra note 74, at 58-59 (observing that in England, dissenting
churches are not entitled to any of the mandatory tithes collected from their congre-
gains) ; see WITrE, supra note 63, at 30, 32 (noting that one of the colonists' grievances
against England was their subjection to the religious taxes and assessments of the Church
of England).
76 MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 21 (summarizing royal control over the
Church of England, including royal power to correct doctrinal errors, to prescribe liturgi-
cal requirements and ministerial qualifications, and to appoint the Archbishop of Canter-
bury and other high church officials); wrrn, supra note 63, at 190 rile [English] com-
mon law prescribed orthodox doctrine, liturgy, and morality ... [and] governed the form
and function of the established church polity. It delineated the boundaries of the parishes
and the location of the churches. It determined the procedures of the vestries and the
prerogatives of the consistories. It defined the duties of the clerics and the amount of their
compensation. It dictated the form of the church corporation and the disposition of its
endowments.") .
77 See, e.g., Carolina Fundamental Constitutions of 1669 1 96, reprinted in 5 THE Fowr-
DERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 74, at 51 (providing that colonial parliament shall estab-
lish parishes and provide for public maintenance of churches and ministers "according to
the Church of England; which being the only true and orthodox, and the national religion
of all the King's dominions, is so also of Carolina; and, therefore, it alone shall be allowed
to receive public maintenance, by grant of parliament"); The Body of Liberties of the Mas-
sachusets Collonie in New England § 58 (1641), reprinted in 5 THE FotnktnEas' CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 74, at 47-48 (providing that the rites, ordinance, "peace," and "Rules of
Christ" observed in the Congregational churches shall be enforceable by civil authorities);
see also Underkuffier, supra note 9, at 578.
In the 17th and 18th centuries, religious oppression and persecution charac-
terised virtually all of the American colonies. Quakers, Baptists, Roman
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lishment in Virginia, for example—the "most rigid and exclusive es-
tablishment of religion in America"—the Church of England enjoyed
the benefit of land grants, financial support by a mandatory tithe, en-
forcement of compulsory Anglican worship, and the harassment and
prohibition of religious competitors. 78
 Baptist, Congregationalist, and
Roman Catholic clergy were routinely fined and imprisoned, and
were subject to summary expulsion from the colony. 79
 Quakers were
frequently subjected to imprisonment and expulsion, and Roman
Catholics were prohibited from holding public office. 80
 Between 1720
and 1750, more Virginians were indicted for failing to attend Angli-
can services than for any other crime, with evasion of mandatory
tithes a close second.81
It is widely accepted that the Establishment Clause (as well as the
Religious Test Clause before it) was included in the Constitution pri-
marily to prevent the federal government from establishing a national
church, and secondarily to insulate then-existing state-established
churches from federal interference.82
 State establishments disap-
Catholics, Jews, and Unitarians were particular targets for persecution.
Criminal penalties, civil disabilities, and other sanctions were imposed if indi-
viduals persisted in the exercise of forbidden faiths, refused to affirm the ten-
ets of the dominant faith, or otherwise offended majority religious sensibili-
ties. Citizens were also taxed for their support of established Christian
churches, a practice which engendered particularly bitter opposition.
Id. For a succinct description of the general characteristics of state-established churches at
the time of the founding, see 1 MELVIN UROFSKY & PAUL FINItELMAN, A MARCH OF LIB-
ERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 71-73 (2d ed. 2002).
" See Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on
Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 Tulsa L. REV. 7, 8 (2001); see also
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 7, at 1142 ("U] here can be no doubt that the Founding Gen-
eration saw compulsory taxation to pay for the salary of clergy, and the construction of
houses of worship, as a constitutional problem of the highest magnitude.").
19
 See, e.g., LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 80 (1953); McConnell, supra
note 78, at 8-9.
89 See, e.g., PFEFFER, supra note 79, at 80.
" See A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF
VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 1680-1810, at 141-42 (1981).
On the original purposes of the Establishment Clause, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 86 (2d ed. 1997); MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION
AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3, 15-16
(1978); WITTE, supra note 63, at 77-78, 163; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 38. On the
original purposes of the Religious Test Clause, which provides that "no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,"
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, see MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 74, at 23; 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 705, 709 (Hilliard, Gray
1833), WrrrE, supra note 63, at 63.
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peared by the early 1800s, however, and the federalism rationale
dropped out of the Establishment Clause altogether with incorpora-
tion in 1947,83 leaving only the anti-establishment rationale, now ap-
plicable to the states as well as the federal government. 84
The three characteristics of the classic eighteenth century estab-
lished church—exercise of government authority, entitlement to gov-
ernment financial support, and subjection to government control—
are reflected in the prohibitions of contemporary separationism: Gov-
ernment may not act in the name of religion (and vice versa), may
not fund the denominational activities of religious organizations, and
' may not interfere in the internal governance decisions of religious
denominations and groups. 85 The constitutionality of church-state
interactions that resemble one of these characteristics, such as the
religious exercise of government power, 86 government funding or
support of religious worship or ritual,87 or government interpretation
of religious doctrine or interference in the selection of religious lead-
ers,88
 are determined by separation analysis. On the other hand, the
constitutionality of other church-state interactions—by definition,
Father Curry has challenged the conventional understanding, arguing that all formal
state establishments had been dismantled by the 1790s, and that practices constituting an
informal or "de facto" Protestant establishment were never understood by the framers to
have been implicated by the Establishment Clause. See CURRY, supra note 33, at 41-43.
86 See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
" See CURRIE, supra note 82, at 86; Wrrtz, supra note 63, at 115.
66 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 52; accord Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (citing Wait, 397
U.S. at 668) ('The three main evils" of establishment are "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.") , Wrrrs, supra note 63, at 183
(reading the three elements of separationism as preventing Irleligious officials" from
"converting the offices of government into instruments of their mission and ministry,"
"[g]overnment" from "funding, sponsoring, or actively involving itself in the religious ex-
ercises of a particular religious group or religious official," and "[r]eligious groups" from
"drawing on government sponsorship or funding for their core religious exercises"); Un-
derkuffler, supra note 9, at 580-81 (describing the "three forms of establishment of relig-
ion by government that are particularly problematic from a constitutional point of view" as
"state favouritism toward particular religious (or nonreligious) groups; the granting of
state financial support to religious institutions; and the assumption by religious institutions
of essentially public functions").
66 E.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459
U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
67 E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sth. Dist., 530 U.S. at 316-17; Lee 505 U.S. at 597-99; Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226-27; Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32.
88 E.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); Presby-
terian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Melte! Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 120-21 (1952); Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,
710-11(1871).
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those that do not raise separationist concerns—such as government
benefits which religious individuals qualify to receive under secular
criteria, or government aid to or funding of secular services per-
formed by religious groups, is properly determined by neutrality
analysis.
In other words, a government interaction with religion is routed
onto one Establishment Clause track or the other on the basis of its
similarity to the attributes of the eighteenth century government-
established church. The more that a government interaction with re-
ligion displays these attributes, the more likely it is that it will be
evaluated by separation rather than neutrality analysis.
C. The Absolute Value of the Separation of Church and State
Just as mere content-neutrality is not a sufficient condition for
upholding a restriction on expression under the Speech Clause, so
also mere neutrality among religious denominations, or between re-
ligion and nonreligion, is not sufficient by itself to sustain a govern-
ment action under the Establishment Clause. For example, for many
years the Court analyzed the constitutionality of direct government
aid to religious organizations in terms of whether the aid was suscep-
tible to diversion from the secular use for which it was provided to a
sectarian use.89 Aid that was capable of being diverted to sectarian
uses was deemed to violate the Establishment Clause, even in the ab-
sence of evidence that the aid was actually so diverted. Under this
analysis, a private religious school's receipt of, say, a computer from
the government under secular disbursement criteria would have
normally been held to violate the Establishment Clause because the
computer could easily be used by the priest or minister of the congre-
gation sponsoring the religious school to track attendance at worship
services, to write sermons delivered at those services, to list potential
persons or areas to target for proselytizing, or for other sectarian re-
ligious purposes. This was true even if it was clear that the computer
had not, in fact, been diverted to any such use.
The Court recently abandoned potential diversion to sectarian
uses as a constitutional test under the Establishment Clause, but a ma-
89
 E.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203; Ball, 473 U.S. at 373; Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229; Roemer
Ed. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 604a (j) (2000) (providing that federal funds supplied directly to faith-based welfare serv-
ice providers pursuant to government contract may not be used for "sectarian worship,
instruction, or proselytization").
1096	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1071
jority of the Court still clings to actual diversion as a constitutional
test. In Mitchell v. Helms, four Justices maintained that both potential
and actual diversion of government aid to sectarian uses are irrelevant
to the constitutionality of an aid program under the Establishment
Clause, arguing that when aid does not have an impermissibly relig-
ious content its distribution according to religiously neutral criteria
does not violate the Establishment Clause, even if the aid is subse-
quently diverted to sectarian uses 9D Two Justices agreed with the plu-
rality on the irrelevance of potential diversion, but flatly rejected the
plurality's abandonment of actual diversion and its adoption of neu-
trality as the sole test, labeling it a rule of "unprecedented breadth." 91
The three dissenters argued for retention of potential diversion as the
appropriate test, which necessarily encompasses actual diversion. 92
Although one can argue that even prohibitions on actual diver-
sion of direct aid to worship, denominational instruction, and other
denominational activities have no real economic effect, 93 such prohi-
bitions serve a useful symbolic purpose. Direct assistance of such ac-
tivities implies government endorsement of a particular religion and
the use of government power, prestige, and largesse to assist that relig-
9° 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion of Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & Scalia
& Kennedy, JJ.).
91 Id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., joined Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); accord
Underktvfiler, supra note 9, at 583 ("the idea that government aid—no matter how mas-
sive—can be given to religious institutions, as long as it is done on a 'neutral' basis, is a
radical departure from previously existing Establishment Clause doctrine."); see also Agos-
tini, 521 U.S. at 239-35 (discarding the presumption that public employees will inevitably
teach religion when performing their secular functions on religious school campuses, in
favor of a standard that inquires whether actual religious teaching by public employees has
taken place).
92 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter & Ginsberg, 11., dissenting)
('The insufficiency of evenhandedness neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of constitu-
tional intent or effect has been clear from the beginning of our interpretive efforts ....").
" Whenever government supplies aid to religious schools, they relieve the school of an
expense that the school would otherwise have had to pay for with its own, privately raised
funds, even if the aid is neither potentially divertible nor actually diverted. Government
aid, even if undivertible and undiverted, frees funds for worship, sectarian instruction, and
other such activities that would otherwise be used to purchase the goods or services sup-
plied by the government. E.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., concurring) ('The [re-
ligious] school is an organism living on one budget. What the taxpayers give for salaries of
those who teach only the humanities or science without any trace of proselytizing enables
the school to use all of its own funds for religious training."). The Court, however, never
accepted this argument. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230 (holding possibility that public
services provided to private religious schools might enable such schools to cut spending in
the same areas insufficient to violate the Establishment Clause); Bal4 473 U.S. at 394 (re-
jecting "the mere possibility of subsidization ... as sufficient to invalidate an aid pro-
gram").
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ion's worship and other sectarian activities—both classic attributes of
the government-established church. Though this harm is largely sym-
bolic, at least if the aid is supplied on a religiously neutral basis, it is
nevertheless significant because of what such direct assistance implies:
the unification of government with a particular religion, and the gov-
ernment's providing direct assistance to that religion's worship and
sectarian activities, underwritten by taxes generally assessed on the
entire population—all three of the classic attributes of the govern-
ment-established church.
A majority of the Court has adhered to a comparable test, based
on a comparable rationale, in some of the equal access cases." The
Court has refused to endorse the proposition that religious speech in
a public forum cannot constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause, reasoning that even if access to the forum is regulated by re-
ligion-neutral conditions, under some circumstances there could be a
reasonable perception that the government endorses the religious
speech occurring there and thereby has violated the Establishment
Clause.95 A reasonable perception that the government, rather than a
private individual or group, is sending a message of religious en-
dorsement suggests one of the attributes of the government estab-
lished church—the use of government power and authority to en-
force the established church's rules and requirements.
" Pipette, 515 U.S. at 753; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819; Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
95 In Pipette, for example, the Court divided along nearly the same lines as it did in
Mitchell .See 515 U.S. at 757. The same four-Justice plurality maintained as a per se rule that
private religious expression occurring in a public forum cannot be attributed to the gov-
ernment and thus cannot under any circumstances violate the Establishment Clause. Id at
770 (plurality opinion by Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., & Kennedy & Thomas, M.).
Three Justices concurred in the judgment, but reserved the possibility that the govern-
ment's operation of a public forum could conceivably create a reasonable perception that
it endorsed religious speech occurring there. hi, at 777-78 (O'Connor, J., joined by Souter
& Breyer,JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 785-86 (Souter, J.,
joined by O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
The dissenters argued that the speech in question in fact created a perception of govern-
ment endorsement notwithstanding its occurrence in a public forum. Id at 807-12 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting); id at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
841-42 (student Christian newspaper's receipt of university subsidy constituting limited
public forum did not violate Establishment Clause because, inter alia, the university took
"pains to disassociate itself" from the Christian newspaper, and any "mistaken impression
that the student newspapers speak for the University" would not have been plausible);
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (church's use of school constituting limited public forum to
show fihn series on Christian child-rearing did not violate Establishment Clause because,
inter alio:, there was "no realistic danger that the community would think that the [school
d] istrict was endorsing religion or any particular creed").
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The use of actual or potential diversion in government aid cases
and the perception of government endorsement in equal access cases
reflect that separation is both historically and functionally at the core
of the Establishment Clause. It was separation, not neutrality, that
spoke to the abuses of the established church in the world of the
founders." In the world of limited government inhabited by the
framers, the mere separation of government and religious authority
created religious liberty. Once government authority was severed from
the established church, the church was unable to punish citizens for
failure to conform to the church's denominational requirements, nor
could it demand exclusive political and governmental privileges for
members. Similarly, separation left the established church with no
greater claim on general tax revenues than other churches and, in-
deed, most other private organizations. Finally, the severance of the
established church from the government left the church free of the
latter's control of its leaders, doctrines, and other internal matters.
Neutrality, on the other hand, is a belated concern brought on by
the growth of positive rights in the American social welfare state. It is
only when the government is a significant source of benefits and assis-
tance for individuals and private groups that one must invoke neutral-
ity to ensure that religious individuals and organizations are not
financially or otherwise penalized simply because of their religious
orientation.
Separation is closer to the core of the Establishment Clause in a
functional as well as a historical sense. If one imagines alternate re-
gimes respectively governed solely by separation and solely by neutral-
ity, it seems clear that the latter holds more potential for the repres-
sion and persecution that characterized the classic establishment of
religion. A purely separationist regime would handicap religions by
denying them financial and other benefits of the social welfare state,
but separation's prohibition on most church-state interactions would
still leave considerable private, unregulated space for the practice of
religion.97 A pure neutrality regime, however, would permit a substan-
tial amount of government action that resembles the classic estab-
" The historical claim that the founders understood the Establishment Clause to be
primarily about neutrality between religious denominations has been decisively refuted by
Professor Laycock. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 33; Douglas Laycock, Wonpreferentiar Aid to
Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1985/86).
97 See Douglas Laycock & Oliver Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 224 (1994) (arguing that the Sherbert-Yoder mandatory exemption doc-
trine abandoned by Smith was a manifestation of separationism).
2002]	 A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause
	 1099
lishtnent. For example, religious organizations could exercise gov-
ernment power and government could directly encourage and fund
religious worship in a regime of neutrality so long as these were done
on a religiously even-handed basis—that is, on the basis of secular cri-
teria." As long as the distribution criteria were secular, it would ap-
parently be of no constitutional significance that the overwhelming
majority of the aid was directed to religious schools." For example, a
local government might give religious groups—along with private
schools, daycare centers, and other nonprofit businesses—the power
unilaterally to prevent the operation in their vicinity of a business to
which they have moral objections."° Public school prayer would be
permissible, so long as religious and secular belief systems were given
equal access to the prayer opportunity. 101 Sectarian religious instruc-
tion could be present in the schools, as one choice among many de-
" See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 4, § 14-7, at 1188 (arguing that under a regime of strict
neutrality, restrictions based on a recipient's religious character would be prohibited, and
governmental programs that benefit religion, including direct subsidies, would be permit-
ted so long as no religious classifications were employed in defining the recipients); Ira C.
Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sec-
tarian Service Providers, J.L. & Pol.. (forthcoming Summer/Fall 2002) ("A fully committed
Neutralist would include religious piety, along with health, safety, and morals, among the
purposes encompassed by government's broad powers to advance the general welfare."),
available at hup://papers.ssrn.cont/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID303837_code020422140.
pdf?abstractid=303837.
9 See, e.g., Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2460 (upholding tuition voucher program in which
ninety-six percent of the voucher funds were directed to religiously affiliated schools);
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388 (upholding tax deduction and credit program in which ninety-six
percent of those who received such tax benefits sent their children to religiously affiliated
schools).
100 Cf. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 120 (striking down statute which granted churches and other
private groups the power to veto operation of a bar within the vicinity).
101 Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Neutrality in Establishment Clause Interpretation: A Potentially
Radical Right Ilan, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS, supra note 67, at 216 ("If equality were
the only constraint imposed by the establishment clause, a school could begin each day
with a prayer so long as every religion got its due."); Clarke E. Cochran, Neutrality and Pub-
lic Policy: Hidden Public Policy Thaps in Mitchell v. Helms, in CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS, su-
pra note 67, at 223, 231.
IT]he door may be opened, if the Thomas plurality opinion fin Mitchell v.
Helms] becomes the Court's controlling view, to religious devotions in public
schools. For the argument could be made that school authorities who allow,
rather than sponsor, students to recite prayers, lead devotions, and the like do
not indoctrinate students. Indoctrination is not present ... because the pray-
ers and devotions of all religions that want to participate would be welcome
(neutrality) and because the devotions themselves would be the private
choices of students and parents.
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nominational and ethical secular ones. 102 Tax dollars could even be
used to build churches and to pay ministers and priests, so long as
such funds were also available to build the meetinghouses and to pay
the leaders of comparable secular organizations.m
It should come as no surprise, then, that the Court's own deci-
sions have repeatedly invoked prevention of the attributes of the clas-
sic establishment of religion as the "core" purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause.'" Whereas the principle of neutrality protects against
disadvantaging religion by denying it the rights and benefits of the
social welfare state, the separation of church and state serves the
more important purpose of protecting against the unification of coer-
cive government power with religious authority, as well as the funding
of denominational worship, ministry, and teaching with general tax
revenues. It also protects against governmental control of the leader-
ship, doctrine, and other internal matters of religious organiza-
tions. 105 The dramatic expansion of government during the twentieth
century meant that for the government to satisfy equality concerns,
religious individuals and organizations had to receive the same
benefits as those received by comparably situated secular individuals
and organizations. It is in this sense that one might speak of the con-
temporary welfare state's having created a "presumption of neutral-
Id.
102 See GED1CKS, supra note 59, at 58-61; Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The
Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L, REV, 673, 723-27 (2002).
los cf. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736 (invalidating provision of statute that lifted requirement
of secular use of buildings constructed with public money at religious university after
twenty years).
144 E.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 601 (An "essential precept of the Establishment Clause" is its
prohibition of "the use of the power or prestige of the government to control, support, or
influence the religious beliefs and practices of the American people."); Bag 473 U.S. at
389 (When "close identification of (governmental] powers and responsibilities with those
of any—or all—religious denominations ... conveys a message of government endorse-
ment or approval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated.");
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126 (The unification of governmental and religious authority violates
the "core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause."); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.,
530 U.S. at 303 n.13 ('"It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guaran-
tees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise ....'") (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989) ("[T]his Court has come to understand the Establishment Clause
to mean that government may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or
organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs
and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious organization, and
may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs.").
10 See Cedicks, supra note 7, at 568-69.
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ity."106 The notion that separation is the more fundamental value
guarding against more serious constitutional evils, however, means
that even if a government relation with religion fully satisfies neutral-
ity, it should still be found to 'violate the Establishment Clause if that
relation partakes of the attributes of the classic government-
established church.
III. THREE DOCTRINAL OBSERVATIONS
The basic insight provided by the two-track theory of the Estab-
lishinent Clause is that separation, not neutrality, is the more funda-
mental Establishment Clause value. Just as the government's interest
in maintaining majoritarian social order must ultimately yield to the
free flow of information and ideas, so also separation defines the limit
of neutrality analysis. The two-track theory of separation and neutral-
ity supplies analytic focus and clarity to several current Establishment
Clause controversies.
A. Tuition Vouchers for Education at Private Schools
With respect to religious school tuition vouchers, the two-track
theory suggests that, in general, voucher programs do not violate the
Establishment Clause. Zelman v, Simons-Harris merely confirmed what
was already clear from the Court's previous decisions: The Establish-
ment Clause permits government monetary aid to flow to religious
schools if the schools qualify for aid under secular criteria and the
determination whether any particular school receives aid is made by
an individual parent or student rather than the governinent. w7 Indi-
106 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 13, at 78; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 98, at 12
("In an era in which equality norms dominate constitutional understandings, claims of
disparate treatment—whether the exclusion of religious entities from government-
controlled benefits, or the exemption of such entities from government regulation—de-
mand justification.").
107 Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 199; e.g., 122 S. Ct. 2460,
2467-68 (2002) (upholding elementary and secondary school tuition voucher program
which included religious schools among eligible participants); see Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997) (upholding provision of remedial education, guidance, and job
counseling services by public school employees to low-income students attending qualified
private elementary or secondary school); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1, 13-14 (1993) (upholding provision of state-salaried sign language interpreter to deaf
student attending Roman Catholic high school); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986) (upholding payment of state vocational rehabilitation
grant on behalf of blind recipient studying for ministry at Bible college); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 402 (1983) (upholding income tax deduction for tuition, textbook, and
1102
	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1071
vidual choice plays an indispensable role in upholding the facial valid-
ity of voucher programs under the Establishment Clause. Unlike in-
kind aid that is allocated directly to a religious school by government,
voucher funds are fully fungible with the school's privately raised
funds. Voucher support for even an unambiguously secular activity of
a religious school frees the school's private funds that otherwise
would have been devoted to the secular activity, and thus constitutes
support for every other activity of the school, including undeniably
sectarian activities." Application of a diversion test to voucher pro-
grams would require participating religious schools to segregate
voucher funds or otherwise to track the goods and services on which
they expend such funds, to demonstrate that the funds had actually
been spent on secular activities and had not been diverted to sectar-
ian uses." Voucher programs generally do not provide for the segre-
gation or tracking of voucher fundsm and the Court has never re-
quired it'll As the Court recently explained in Zelman, "DA] here a
government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and pro-
vides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choices," any advancement or en-
dorsement of the schools' religious mission "is reasonably attributable
to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends
with the disbursement of benefits."n2 Any advancement or endorse-
ment of religion, in other words, is "caused" by the individual recipi-
ent, and not by the government, so that the Establishment Clause is
not violated. 113
Given the pervasive government funding of education, allowing
religious schools to accept voucher funds bears no greater resem-
transportation expenses incurred in sending child to public or qualified private elemen-
tary or secondary school).
1°8 Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Relig-
ious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 20, 31 (1989).
109 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000) (prohibiting faith-based contractors from using fed-
eral funds paid directly to such contractors in "sectarian worship, instruction, or proselyti-
zation") ; Esbeck, supra note 4, at 304-05 (acknowledging the duty of the government to
account for how appropriated tax funds are utilized by institutional recipients).
no see Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Coanuu. L. REV. 783, 786 (2002).
111 See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
112 122 S. Ct. at 2467.
Ill See GEDicKs, supra note 59, at 49-50. For a critical assessment of this analysis, see
Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond; The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. U. 167 (2000).
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blance on its face to a classic religious establishment than does the
provision of police or fire protection to such schools." 4 Nevertheless,
there may be circumstances in which separation analysis would prop-
erly apply to invalidate voucher programs. 115
 First, separation analysis
should apply when voucher funds are directed to religious schools
that discriminate in favor of members of their sponsoring denomina-
tion, or that otherwise discriminate on the basis of religion. If most
private school participants in voucher programs are religiously spon-
sored, as appears to be the case, and if private schools provide a
significantly better education, as some voucher proponents dab -11, 116
then admissions discrimination by religious schools in favor of the
congregants or members of the sponsoring religion will resemble the
reservation of educational privileges that characterized the classic re-
ligious establishment.'" Separation analysis thus demands, at a mini-
mum, that voucher participants employ nondiscriminatory admissions
policies.
Second, if most private school participants in voucher programs
are religious, and if educational gains by such participants are in fact
achieved at the expense of public schools, as some voucher opponents
predict,"8
 then parents in areas subject to voucher programs may find
114 See Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 200 ("Mt is clearly
permissible to allow government aid to flow directly to religious schools, so long as the
schools qualify for the aid under secular criteria, and the amount of the aid is determined
by student or parental choice and not by a government decision maker.").
114
 For an insightful theoretical model analyzing challenges to voucher programs un-
der the Establishment Clause, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 98, at 22-56.
ne See, e.g., Joseph P. Viteritti, School Choice and American Constitutionalism, in CHARTERS,
VOUCHERS, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 114, 130 (Paul E. Peterson & David E. Campbell eds.,
2001); Jay P. Greene, The Surprising Consensus on School Choice, Pus. INT. (Summer 2001),
available at hup://www.thepublicinterest.com/archives/2001sumnier/article2.1itnil;
 Nina
Shokraii Rees, Public School Benefits of Private School Vouchers, 93 POL'Y REV. (Jan.-Feb. 1999),
available at http://www.policyreview.org/jan99/rees.hunl.
117 1 am grateful to Professor Tuttle for this suggestion. This analysis does not call into
question Corp. of the Presiding Bishop u Amos, 479 U.S. 1052 (1987), which upheld the power
of Congress to exempt nonprofit institutions using their own funds from the religious
antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII, see Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion
Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality The-
ory" and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pus. POL'Y 243, 255 & n.33
(1999), as opposed to the use of government funds in such discrimination, see Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding revocation of tax exempt status of
religious university acting on racially discriminatory religious beliefs).
us See, e.g., Bob Chase, Voucher System Would Hurt Schools Not Help, Wisconsin Education
Association Council, at http://www.weac.org/news/dec96/neavouch.htm
 (posted Dec. 2,
1996); Anti-Defamation League, School Vouchers: The Wrong Choice for Public Education, at
http://www.adl.org/vouchers/vouchers_main.asp
 (last visited Sept. 2002).
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that they are forced as a practical matter to place their children in
private religious schools to obtain an adequate education, irrespective
of preference.ng This bears a strong resemblance to the classic relig-
ious establishment's reliance on government financial assistance to
force participation in its services and activities. Thus, even a voucher
program that requires a nondiscriminatory admissions policy on the
part of religious participants may still be found invalid under the Es-
tablishment Clause if the program does not provide adequate secular
schools as an alternative. 1 °
Finally, neutrality analysis would permit the situation in which all
of the activities of a participating religious school, including religious
instruction and worship, are fully funded by voucher monies. Al-
though the secular component of the education offered by a religious
school may be quite high in comparison to the religious compo-
nent, 121 it necessarily constitutes less, perhaps substantially less, than
the entire educational experience, combining secular and religious
components, offered by the school. If government funding exceeds
the secular value of the education provided by a religious school, then
it may reasonably be argued that this excess is funding the school's
119 Blasi, supra note 110, at 810 (suggesting that the Establishment Clause might be vio-
lated if a voucher system resulted in so many students in a school district choosing a par-
ticular religious school that it became the only local educational institution, public or pri-
vate, able to provide a decent education," or "if the pattern of choices resulted in a variety
of religious schools but no viable secular schools, public or private"); Lupu Be Tuttle, supra
note 98, at 55 ('The combination of legal compulsion to educate their children, and the
practical compulsion to avoid substandard schools, means that parents are not entirely free
to accept or decline the offered exits from the neighborhood schools."); Martha Minow,
Reforming School Reform, 68 FottottAm L. Ray. 257, 267 (1999) ("Experts predict the emer-
gence of a two-tiered system [as the result of voucher programs]: elite schools benefiting
from competition and other schools declining—but not shutting down—as their student
enrollments shrink and resources accordingly diminish."). Professor Eugene Volokh ar-
gues that this situation would be rare, and in any event, is easily remedied by, for example,
requiring that a school board keep open at least one public school in every locality, or
placing a cap on the percentage of voucher funds going to religious schools. See Eugene
Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 Noma DAME J.L. E•nucs & Pun. POCY 341,
350 & n.14 (1999).
120 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 98, at 55, ('The combination of legal compulsion to
educate their children, and the practical compulsion to avoid substandard schools ...
should be sufficient to shift to the government the burden of showing that voucher recipi-
ents have sufficient nonreligious educational chokes, reasonably equal in quality to the relig-
ious choices available, to preclude an inference that government is responsible for steering
children into the religious training actually received by [voucher]-financed students.").
This should be the case particularly when religious schools participating in the voucher
program are not required to allow students to opt out of worship or sectarian teaching
otherwise required by the school. Id. at 56-57.
121 See GEDICKS, supra note 59, at 88.
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religious activities. 122
 That situation might test the commitment of
some members of the Zelman majority, particularly Justice O'Connor,
to the proposition that individual choice insulates religious schools
from facial Establishment Clause review. In any event, such a situation
would resemble the funding of ministerial leadership and denomina-
tional teaching and worship in the classic religious establishment by
mandatory tithes or other general tax revenues. 123
 Under separation
analysis, voucher programs would violate the Establishment Clause if
the secular value of the education provided by religious schools re-
ceiving voucher funds is less than the amount of such funds received
by the school.
B. Faith-based Provision by Government of Social Services
President Bush's promised expansion of faith based social service
initiatives is bogged down in questions about the extent to which (if at
all) religious social service providers should be exempt from federal
antidiscrimination laws in hiring their employees. In one sense, an
exemption permitting religious providers to discriminate in favor of
their own members merely gives to such providers what secular non-
profits enjoy as a matter of course. Nonreligious providers are gener-
ally permitted to hire only those employees who share their ideologi-
cal premises. For example, it violates no law for a secular provider to
refuse to hire an applicant who is categorically opposed to providing
welfare services to the poor. A secular provider who believes that the
poor are exploited by capitalists in a worldwide class conflict may dis-
criminate in favor of Marxists, just as a secular provider who believes
that the poor are responsible for their own situations may discrimi-
nate in favor of economic conservatives who believe that wealth is ac-
122 See Blasi, supra note 110, at 786 ("[O]pponents observe that the scale of the
[voucher] subsidy means that tax revenues supplant rather than supplement the tradi-
tional, voluntary sources of funding for religious education, a feature that distinguishes
vouchers from the much smaller, more specialized and restricted subsidies that occasion-
ally have been upheld."); Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 61, at 288-90 (observing that in some
religious school aid cases the Court has emphasized the relative insignificance of govern-
ment funding as a percentage of a religious school's overall budget); Underkuffler, supra
note 113, at 181,187 (same).
123 See Blasi, supra note 110, at 786 ("As opponents view the matter, what is distinctive
about vouchers is that coercively generated tax revenues pay for unambiguously religious
instruction."); cf. Underkuffler, supra note 113, at 187 (arguing that "complete funding" of
religious schools or other religious institutions "would clearly violate the prerogatives of
conscience of individual taxpayers and encourage integration of governmental and relig-
ious institutional power").
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cumulated only by hard work. Exempting religious providers from
antidiscrimination laws permits such providers to hire only those who
share the religious beliefs that motivate and inform such providers'
decisions to provide welfare services. Such an exemption would give
to religious providers the same ideological discretion in hiring that
nonreligious providers already have. 124
On the other hand, antidiscrimination exemptions implicate
separation analysis in two opposing ways. Application of external so-
cial norms to religious providers' hiring decisions resembles govern-
ment control over the leadership of the government-established
church, particularly if the position being filled requires significant
managerial or leadership responsibilities. Yet, the reservation of posi-
tions for congregants of the church sponsoring the religious provider
clearly resembles the reservation of government and political privi-
leges for communicants that characterized the classic Anglican estab-
lishment, particularly if the positions do not entail significant mana-
gerial or leadership responsibilities. Separation analysis thus points to
a narrow antidiscrimination exemption, reaching only those who, at
one extreme, like parish priests or employment counselors, exercise
leadership or doctrinal authority in the sponsoring church, and not
applying to those, at the other extreme, like receptionists, custodians,
or mail clerks, whose jobs would require only a general (and not nec-
essarily religious) commitment to government provision of social serv-
ices.
C. Public School Prayer
The turn to neutrality in the 1980s and 1990s invigorated propo-
nents of organized group prayer in public schools. The tactics cur-
rently employed by such proponents—a requirement of "nonde-
nominational" prayers, a statement that the prayer merely "solem-
nizes" a school event, the delegation to voting student majorities of
the decision whether to pray, and allowing such majorities to pick the
person delivering the prayer from among a pool that includes poten-
tially the entire student body—are all attempts to evade the strictures
of church-state separation by fitting public school prayer under the
umbrella of neutrality.125
124 See Ira C. Lupu, Why Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right—Reflections  on City
of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 793, 809 (1998).
125 See Blasi, supra note 110, at 791 (referring to "the dubious practices, justified in the
name of so-called 'civil religion,' whereby public institutions invoke assertedly ecumenical
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This recourse to neutrality, however, obscures several fundamen-
tal issues of school-sponsored prayer, all of which entail separationist
analysis. First, if school policy dictates a prayer, and the prayer that is
actually delivered retains any theological content, the school is impli-
cated in and responsible for that content, which necessarily violates
the Establishment Clause.I 26 It is obvious that in a radically pluralistic
society like the United States, even the most "nondenominational"
religious observances are bound to offend some believers, and in
some contexts may even coerce them. 127
Second, the use of government to sponsor and to encourage par-
ticipation in worship and other religious rituals is an attribute of the
established church. Indeed, the very attempt to dictate the content of
that worship, as many public school prayer policies do, resembles one
of the most repressive aspects of the established church. Finally, dele-
gation to religious majorities of government decision making about
creation and access to the prayer opportunity constitutes the uncon-
stitutional delegation of governmental power to religion, yet another
attribute of the established church.'"
The only way that group prayer can occur in public schools is
when it is initiated by an individual student in a genuinely open fo-
rum—that is, a forum open to indiscriminate use by a wide variety of
(though almost invariably theistic) religious rituals, symbols, and precepts to solemnize
civic endeavors"); cf. Jay Alan Sekulow et at., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech
and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1995) (arguing for the
constitutionality of student-initiated prayer and proselytizing in public schools on the basis
of content-neutrality and other Speech Clause doctrines).
128
 E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306-10 (2000) (finding that
because selection process for pre-game speaker invited and encouraged religious mes-
sages, those present at the game reasonably perceived the religious message as "a public
expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of
the school administration" in violation of the Establishment Clause); see Gedicks, Establish-
ment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 203 (arguing that speaker-identity and subject-
matter restrictions that exclude most nonreligious speakers and messages create the rea-
sonable perception that those who deliver a religious message satisfying such restrictions
are speaking on behalf of the government).
iv E.g., Newdow v. United States Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002) (two-to-
one decision) ("Although defendants argue that the religious content of 'one nation un-
der God' [in the Pledge of Allegiance] is minimal, to an atheist or a believer in certain
non Judeo-Christian religions or philosophies, it may reasonably appear to be an attempt
to enforce a 'religious orthodoxy' of monotheism, and is therefore impermissible."); see
Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 60, at 327 (discussing Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)).
128
 Cf. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 305 (noting that student elections for the
purpose of choosing whether a prayer shall occur and who shall deliver it impermissibly
place minority views about such prayers at the mercy of majority views).
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student speakers other than those who wish to pray.' Few school
administrators are willing to risk such lack of control. As a conse-
quence, separation analysis will generally preclude organized group
prayer in public schools.
CONCLUSION
An Establishment Clause based solely on neutrality presupposes
that the core anti-establishment concerns of the Clause are no longer
relevant. Although the possibility of full-scale restoration of the classic
religious establishment in the United States is remote,'" there is nev-
ertheless a credible threat that theological tolerance might replace
theological skepticism as the conceptual model of the Establishment
Clause. There is a disturbing insistence on the part of some that the
United States is a "Christian nation" whose laws and government must
reflect that "fact."131 Although the nation as a whole is religiously plu-
ral, perhaps even radically so, such pluralism does not obtain in every
part of the country. For example, Mormons control Utah and exert
considerable influence in the rest of the western Rockies; fundamen-
talist and other conservative Christians dominate the rural South and
Midwest; and Roman Catholics and even Jews wield considerable po-
litical and cultural power in California, the Northeast, and many ur-
129 See Gedicks, Establishment Clause Neutrality, supra note 67, at 203 (*The Court has
consistently invalidated government-sponsored prayer whenever the government seeks to
dictate or encourage the selection of a (particular) religious speaker or a (particular) re-
ligious message—that is, whenever the government is not willing to open up the opportu-
nity for prayer into a true public forum permitting 'indiscriminate use' by secular as well
as religious speakers for secular as well as religious messages.").
1" See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("At this point in the 20th century
we are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Es-
tablishment Clause in the Bill of Rights.").
See, e.g., James Dobson, Family News from Dr: James Dobson, Focus on the Family Newslet-
ter, June 1996, at 3-4 (endorsing both the position that it is the "duty" of Americans "to
select and prefer Christians" as their political leaders, and the declaration that the United
States "is a Christian nation"); see also GILLES KEPEL, THE REVENGE OF GOD: THE RESUR-
GENCE OF ISLAM, CHRISTIANITY, AND JUDAISM IN THE MODERN WORLD 110, 123 (Alan Bra-
ley trans., 1994) (observing that since the mid-1970s, Protestant fundamentalists have en-
dorsed "a political transformation of American by means of re-Christianization," with the
goal of "'the principles of the Bible'" becoming "'the law of the land'" (quoting GARY
NORTH, CHRISTIAN RECONSTRUCTION) ); GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING FUNDA-
MENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 95, 110 (1991) (noting the birth of a powerful funda-
mentalist Protestant coalition in the 1970s opposed to abortion rights, pornography, and
the Equal Rights Amendment; supporting school prayer; and stressing theological ortho-
doxy, rejection of secular morality, and "incivility toward persons with other beliefs" in
addition to traditional evangelizing).
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ban areas. Thus, even if there is no credible national threat of the im-
position of a tolerance model of the Establishment Clause, there is
danger of such imposition in many states and localities. Separation
and the two-track Establishment Clause speak to that danger. Like the
two-track Speech Clause, which allows substantial regulation of low-
value speech while preserving maximum constitutional protection for
the political speech that is at the core of that Clause, the two-track Es-
tablishment Clause allows religious individuals and organizations to
enjoy the rights and benefits of the social welfare state, while still safe-
guarding the anti-establishment concerns at the core of the Estab-
lishment Clause.
